Poland, Poland, Poland… Peak, Peak, Peak.
When the praise gets louder, look for the trapdoor. Under the PPP headlines: debt, dependence, demographic decay.
When The Economist puts your country on the cover, it’s rarely a compliment.
It usually means the boom is priced in, the foreign press has just caught up, and the trapdoor is already half-open.
This week, it was Poland’s turn. Four times. In bright red. “Poland, Poland, Poland, Poland.” A not-so-subtle coronation from the British neoliberal priesthood. The Economist wants you to believe Poland has arrived. That it’s now the fourth musketeer of Europe. That its standard of living just leapfrogged Japan’s. That it’s the continent’s most dynamic military and economic power.
But as usual, there’s a lot they’re not saying. And what they are saying, they’re saying at a very convenient time: one week before a pivotal presidential election.
Let’s address the obvious. Publishing a glowing feature on Poland—complete with a nationalistic, almost romantic visual aesthetic—days before a presidential runoff isn’t journalism. It’s a narrative push.
The Economist wants Poland to stay on the pro-EU track. That means a centrist president, Rafal Trzaskowski, and not the PiS-backed nationalist Karol Nawrocki. Fair enough. But let’s not pretend this is neutral reporting. It’s an ideological intervention wrapped in data.
The centerpiece of the article is Poland overtaking Japan in GDP per capita (PPP). That’s right—purchasing power parity, the economist’s favorite tool for narrative manipulation.
Sure, PPP says the average Pole can now afford more than the average Japanese person when adjusted for cost of living. But here’s what they don’t say:
Nominal GDP per capita still puts Japan 26% ahead. That’s what investors care about.
Poland’s consumption boom is credit-driven. That’s not sustainable without wage productivity catch-up.
Half the population lives paycheck to paycheck. According to locals. That’s not prosperity.
Rents, food, and real estate are surging. Just ask the working class.
PPP doesn’t measure inequality. It doesn’t measure national wealth. It doesn’t reflect how hard it is to save, invest, or retire. It’s a feel-good metric for economic marketers.
Poland’s rise is real. But it’s fragile.
The Economist gushes about Poland’s massive defense spending—over 4.7% of GDP, with plans for 5% next year. That makes Poland NATO’s biggest spender after the U.S. on a percentage basis.
But let’s ask the hard question: Is Poland becoming a sovereign security leader—or just Washington’s forward operating base?
NATO expansion. U.S. bases. Defense deals. Ukraine logistics.
Poland’s militarization makes sense in a hostile neighborhood. But this isn’t just about defense—it’s about alignment. With U.S. policy. With NATO’s eastern flank strategy. With the decoupling of Europe from continental autonomy.
The Economist frames this as a triumph of sovereignty. It’s actually the opposite: a de facto outsourcing of Polish military posture to American geopolitical priorities.
No serious analyst believes Poland is heading for Polexit. Not with 80%+ EU support in polls. Not with EU funds still rolling in.
But there’s a more insidious danger: Becoming the next Hungary.
Not leaving the EU—but being ignored by it. Obstructing key decisions. Losing credibility. Getting sidelined in Brussels.
That’s what happened under PiS. That’s what could happen again if a nationalist president blocks EU-aligned reforms. The veto power of the Polish presidency isn’t symbolic—it’s a policy wrecking ball.
And it’s why this election matters.
The Economist rightly highlights Poland’s strong growth record—no recession since 2004 (except COVID), 4% average annual growth, booming manufacturing, and EU-funded infrastructure.
But the cracks are visible:
FDI inflows are down 50% year-on-year.
Most foreign investment is low-tech, low-R&D.
Bank lending to businesses is among the lowest in the EU.
Private credit demand is shrinking.
This isn’t the path to an innovation economy. It’s the path to stagnation.
Without structural reform—higher-value exports, R&D-driven growth, deeper capital markets—Poland risks hitting the ceiling of the middle-income trap.
Ask Malaysia. Ask Turkey.
Poland’s energy transition is ambitious on paper: PLN 700 billion in green investment, nuclear buildout, wind expansion, energy storage.
But the execution? Bureaucratic sludge. Regulatory gray zones. A grid that can’t handle solar surges. And zero visibility on industrial coordination.
Sound familiar? It should.
This is Europe’s Achilles heel: grand plans crushed by fragmented authority and institutional inertia.
If Poland wants to be a climate leader, it needs more than budgets and slogans. It needs functioning institutions.
Poland has gone all-in on Ukraine. Exports have quadrupled. Migrants have integrated. Poland is Kyiv’s logistics hub and post-war partner.
It’s noble. It’s strategic. It’s economically beneficial—but it’s not without risk.
Supply chains are overstretched.
Inflationary pressure from demand spikes is real.
Political fatigue is building, even among allies.
If Ukraine fatigue spreads west—and Poland’s role becomes a burden rather than a badge—there could be political blowback at home.
And a far-right surge in Poland wouldn’t be shocking.
The Economist wants Poland to be a European miracle story. And to some extent, it is.
But miracles don’t last when they’re built on fragile foundations—cheap credit, imported capital, and foreign protection.
Poland is rising, yes. But it’s also being used.
Used by the EU for growth optics. Used by the U.S. for military positioning. Used by politicians for nationalism or federalism, depending on the season.
The real question isn’t whether Poland is rising. It’s whether Poland is steering.
Because if it’s not, then this moment—the “Poland, Poland, Poland” moment—could be the top.
And The Economist, as always, showed up just in time to print the peak.